

MOBILISING CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE

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About Volonteuropa

Volonteuropa is an international network promoting volunteering, active citizenship and social justice in Europe and beyond.

Volonteuropa works at all levels, from the local to the international, and across the public, private and third sectors. We facilitate exchange, foster collaboration, and carry out research and advocacy.

Volonteuropa currently has over 50 members in more than 20 countries across Europe.

Established in the Netherlands in 1981, Volonteuropa's Secretariat is hosted by Volunteering Matters, the UK's leading volunteering charity in policy and practice.

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Foreword

The year 2015 is in many ways a quite remarkable milestone year.

At the start of this millennium, in the year 2000, the international community of nations adopted an ambitious shared global agenda aimed at eradicating poverty and inequality around the world: the Millennium Development Goals, or MDGs for short. A set of eight global goals and related targets were agreed, to be achieved by 2015 as a result of true partnership between governments and people around the world.

Now that it IS 2015, even the greatest cynic may have to admit that quite a lot has actually been achieved. The spread of HIV and AIDS has been stopped and is beginning to reverse. More children than ever before enjoy basic education. The number of women dying while giving birth has been dramatically reduced, as has the number of children dying before their 5th birthday. But now that it IS 2015, even the greatest optimist may have to admit that in many ways the goals set in 2000 have not been achieved. More than one billion people in the world still go to sleep hungry each day. Gender equality is far from a universal practice. Inequality and discrimination are rampant within societies the world over. The world can hardly be called a peaceful place with all the violent conflicts filling our news bulletins each day. And the envisaged global partnership (MDG8) is under severe stress: Fewer and fewer countries are willing or able to invest 0.7% of their GDP in official development assistance, despite binding agreements. In fact, nations that used to be '0.7% champions' are today actually slashing their international development cooperation budgets.

Of course, some plausible excuses exist for these shortfalls. Massive and rapid shocks have fundamentally changed the world that we knew in 2000. Who could have possibly foreseen that on 11 September 2001 the world order and international relations would be completely turned upside down when hijacked planes flew into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.? And when the MDGs were agreed, who could have reasonably foreseen that by the end of 2007 the entire industrialised world would be gripped by an acute banking and financial crisis, evolving into a protracted global economic crisis of unparalleled proportions, from which recovery – if it is actually taking place at all – is painfully slow?

Now in 2015, the world gets ready to start implementing a new (and better?) plan for the next 15 years, building on the successes of the MDGs while drawing lessons from the ways in which they failed. The new buzzword, 'sustainable development goals', is far from a hollow phrase. Sustainability is key, and so is universality. A much more participatory global process led to the formulation of a new set of 17 overarching goals, further defined in 169 proposed targets and 304 proposed indicators. At least this time around, we may have the benefit of hindsight with regards to what did, and did not, work well with the MDGs. But, will we also have the benefit of foresight in dealing with the new challenges posed by global mega-trends that will be impacting governments and citizens alike as we move into 2030? The challenges that we need to be prepared to meet include:

- **Demographic and social challenges:** By 2025, the global population will reach about 8 billion, with the over-65s being the fastest-growing group. Africa's population is projected to double by 2050, while Europe's is expected to shrink, with soaring healthcare costs as a result of population ageing.

- **Challenges of shifting global economic power:** China is rapidly catching up with and overtaking the USA as the world's largest economy. The aggregate purchasing power of the 'E7' emerging economies – Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey – will overtake that of the current G7 by 2030, and will be lifting millions out of poverty while also exerting more influence in the global economy. With a rebalancing of global power, international institutions and national governments will need to adopt and maintain greater transparency and inclusiveness.
- **Urbanisation challenges:** In 1800, 2% of the world's population lived in cities. Now it's 50%. And by 2030, it will be almost two-thirds. Every week, some 1.5 million people join the urban population. The number of people living in urban slums has risen by a third since 1990. Cities occupy 0.5% of the world's surface, but consume 75% of its resources.
- **Climate change and environmental degradation:** Climate change as a result of unchecked greenhouse gas emissions is driving a complex mix of unpredictable changes to the environment while further challenging the resilience of natural and man-built systems. The developing world will have to shoulder 75%-80% of the adaptation costs, with East Asia and Pacific regions carrying the highest costs. Unless global warming is kept within 2 degrees Celsius, it is expected that some 200 million people will become permanently displaced due to the degradation or disappearance of their living environments.
- **Challenges of stress on resources:** Population growth, economic growth and climate change will place increased stress on essential natural resources, including water, food, arable land and energy. Unless fundamental changes in policies take place, about 1 billion more people will live in areas of water stress by 2030. The International Energy Agency projects an approximate 40% increase in global energy demand by 2030.

There are more challenges I could have included, such as the proliferation of armed conflicts and violence around the world and the resulting massive flows of internally displaced persons and international refugees. Never before have there been so many refugees, at present more than 60 million according to UNHCR).

In short, governments and people will have to deal with some pretty complex challenges as they adopt and start to implement a new and ambitious framework of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The bottom line is: There is no single entity that can be responsible for the realisation of these ambitious goals. Not any single government, not the UN, not the EU, not any civil society organisation.

Given the challenges we face, these SDGs can only be achieved if everyone on this planet truly buys into them and contributes in their own way and at their own level to their realisation. Everyone. Every business and every citizen too. It really means: EVERYONE.

In that sense, the European Year for Development (EYD2015) was extremely well timed. One of its objectives was to foster real dialogue with and between citizens of the EU about why it makes sense to invest energy and resources in international development cooperation, despite mounting challenges at home, It sought also to engage these citizens and mobilise them to be the change that they want to see. After all, when we speak about development cooperation in the new millennium, it should not be about 'what we give' but much more about 'how we live', including how we consume the limited resources of this planet we are sharing with close to 7 billion people, heading towards 9 billion by 2050.

The engagement of citizens should be about how we are all of us, all 7 or 8 or 9 billion, parts of OUR world, living in OUR dignity and heading towards OUR common future. “Our world, our dignity, our future”, the motto of EYD2015.

That engagement with and by citizens of the EU about the sense and nonsense of international development cooperation and about the role of each of us in that endeavour is what makes 2015 a remarkable milestone year in yet another way. And this report, by providing a platform for civil society organisations to showcase the important contributions made by volunteers to sustainable development and global justice, will hopefully play an integral role in mobilising citizens for change in Europe and beyond.

Marius Wanders

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KEY TERMS

EU	European Union
UN	United Nations
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
CSO	Civil society organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation

Introduction

Mobilising Citizens for Global Justice

2015 marks the deadline for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the start of the post-2015 development agenda, which includes a new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As such, it is an ideal time to look at what has been achieved so far and, more importantly, what remains to be done.

At the European level, 2015 has been named the European Year for Development (EYD2015). Volonteurope became involved in the EYD2015 campaign as part of an alliance of CSOs led by CONCORD. Though not directly involved in development work, Volonteurope is driven by a strong commitment to volunteering, active citizenship and social justice. In view of this, EYD2015 represented an excellent opportunity to showcase the role of active citizenship, and volunteering in particular, in promoting social justice – not just in Europe, but globally.

The scale of the development challenges we face demands a concerted effort from the international community. For too long, national governments, lobbyists and high-level decision makers have dominated the development debate, giving CSOs, grassroots movements and citizens some air time but limited capacity to bring about the necessary changes. Volonteurope's contribution to the development debate, embodied in this report, is rooted in the belief that civil society should play a leading role in responding to current development challenges.

As a network of CSOs specialising in volunteering and active citizenship, we asked experts from the field to help us answer the following question: How can we mobilise citizens for sustainable development and global justice in the context of the post-2015 agenda?

In **Chapter 1**, the Red Cross EU Office focuses on humanitarian aid, highlighting the role of volunteers in responding to natural or man-made disasters, armed conflicts or other situations threatening human life, wellbeing and dignity. The authors argue that operating as an effective humanitarian network means continuously striving to better prepare and support volunteers.

Chapter 2 features Social Platform's perspective on the evolution of social protection and social service provision in the EU. The authors identify two trends taking place in Europe: a tendency to 'externalise' social protection and service provision to the third sector, the social economy; and a 'race to the bottom' in the level and duration of social benefits. These trends, they argue, compromise citizens' right to a dignified life and undermine social justice. They call on the EU to seize the opportunity to reinvent the European social model and put Europe on a stronger and fairer footing in the world.

Alianza por la Solidaridad focuses on gender issues in **Chapter 3**, arguing that, while the EU has placed itself at the forefront of the global fight for gender equality, there exists a sizeable gap

between the commitments made by European leaders and reality. The author maintains that women still face tremendous barriers, that there is a lack of resources available for achieving gender equality, and that a concerted effort is needed to achieve genuine equality both within and beyond the EU. Volunteering is seen as an opportunity to raise awareness about gender issues, and call for greater accountability with respect to gender policies and the implementation of the SDGs.

Chapter 4, also from Alianza por la Solidaridad, outlines the minimum requirements for an adequate international climate change agreement, arguing that it must be aligned with development aspirations and the post-2015 development agenda goals.

Looking at the specific case of Peace Brigades International's volunteer-based international accompaniment model, **Chapter 5** explores the role of international volunteering in strengthening and extending the peace and security objectives of the post-2015 agenda. First recognising that volunteers are key agents of change, the authors continue by illustrating how volunteering for peace in fragile and conflict affected environments can bring about long-lasting social and structural change and improve the security of human rights defenders and CSOs. The chapter explores how and under what circumstances the post-2015 agenda and volunteer-based organisations work in favour of peace and how they can support each other to enhance peace and security.

Chapter 6 argues that the 'Fortress Europe' approach to migration is not working, claiming that the EU is failing to manage migration in a way that respects human rights. The authors maintain that civil society has played, and must continue to play, a role in defending the rights of migrants and refugees. Its role includes mobilising citizens; monitoring political, legislative and judicial decisions; pushing for transnational solidarity; and, in some cases, exercising disobedience.

In **Chapter 7**, Volutare showcases the many benefits of corporate volunteering. The private sector, the author argues, has a tremendous potential to contribute to sustainable development, and must work with the public and third sectors to harness this potential.

Chapter 8, a joint piece from CIECODE and Alianza por la Solidaridad, asks whether the post-2015 agenda should be seen as transformative and transparent. It argues that progressive tools and mechanisms are key to engaging citizens in bringing about the systemic changes needed, focusing on the case of civil society involvement in EU decision making and action.

CHAPTER 1

Bringing flour to Aleppo: Volunteering and humanitarian aid

Red Cross EU Office

Abstract

Volunteers play an indispensable role in humanitarian aid. Many operations across the world depend on large numbers of volunteers willing to help people in need, often in areas where many others either cannot or do not want to act. For the Red Cross Red Crescent, operating as an effective humanitarian network means continuously striving to better support and prepare our numerous local volunteers, who are on the frontlines of almost every humanitarian response.

Introduction

'War & Trauma - Medical Care in World War I' was one of several excellent exhibitions commemorating the Great War when hundreds of thousands of soldiers lost their lives on Belgian and French battlefields. It was an impressive display of frontline reports, stories, photos, witness testimonies and the crude medical tools of the time. It turned out many of the stories were about volunteers. Not the ones with weapons in their hands fighting the enemy, but those with bandages, stretchers and motorised ambulances taking care of injured soldiers on the battlefield and along the transport routes to safety. Thousands of courageous men and women had volunteered, from France, Belgium, Britain and Germany. Among them were the scientist Marie Curie as well as the artist Max Beckmann. They stepped in, put on their Red Cross armbands and attended to the wounded. One cannot imagine the suffering and the despair these volunteers must have encountered. This was volunteering in 1914. A hundred years later volunteering is very different. Or is it?

As a network with members in 189 countries, we look at volunteering from a global perspective. Humanitarian assistance is what we do and what unites us as a movement. Wherever a disaster, conflict or crisis strikes and threatens peoples' lives, Red Cross Red Crescent volunteers step forward to help people in need. During the Ebola crisis, thousands of local volunteers were deployed in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Senegal to take care of the infected and the deceased, and to deliver health promotion activities within their communities. The recent polio eradication scheme in West Africa was successful thanks to 7,000 volunteers who spread information and vaccines across the region. After the earthquake in Nepal, local volunteers responded immediately and brought aid to many remote villages. In Syria, volunteers keep delivering urgently needed supplies to isolated communities. They themselves get caught in the midst of gruesome shootings and struggle to stay safe while saving others. These volunteers see human suffering. They see pain, trauma and death. Can one imagine what they are going through? For one million out of 17 million Red Cross Red Crescent volunteers this is volunteering. Volunteering in the year 2015.



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Humanitarian aid: what exactly is it?

Governments and organisations use the term 'humanitarian aid' to describe short-term emergency assistance provided to people in need, people who are victims of natural or

man-made disasters, armed conflicts or other situations threatening human life, wellbeing and dignity. When local governance structures cannot cope with the demand for assistance, the survival of residents may depend entirely on external assistance. This is when international organisations, governments, the EU and others mobilise their resources to organise emergency aid for the affected region. In many of these responses, the majority of humanitarian aid ends up being delivered through local volunteers. “We do many things: repairing the main water line that supplies the whole city, evacuating dead bodies, repairing water and electricity lines, transporting medication and vaccines to the needy throughout the governorate, exchanging processes between parties to the conflict, and bringing flour to Aleppo when the roads were cut off” (Red Crescent volunteer, Syria).

Aid and supplies are, typically, linked to basic needs but delivered in dangerous environments and under time pressure. In this situation, humanitarian assistance cannot be a ‘nice’ project; rather, it is a fast and forceful operation, mobilising thousands of helping hands reaching out to millions of victims. We believe humanitarian aid is only possible with volunteers. Many volunteers. We also believe humanitarian aid needs volunteers who are trained, equipped and prepared. Volunteers who know what they are doing and who can also adapt quickly to changing conditions.

“The environment was complex, things were changing so rapidly and regularly that we couldn’t tell where the next set of problems were coming from. Ebola spread quickly across three countries and at the start we were always a step behind it. And then suddenly you could have other problems burst out that complicated it all even further” (Red Cross volunteer, West Africa).

Doing it from a European point of view: EU Aid Volunteers

When we talk about humanitarian volunteers, we usually mean local volunteers

who know the country and are part of the community. In a world that is increasingly global and mobile, there are also citizens who wish to engage as international volunteers and show solidarity with those who most need it. Just like their local counterparts, they have skills, expertise and motivation, and they are willing to share them. We must find appropriate ways to help support and channel these ambitions in a manner that is both effective and cost-efficient, bringing sustainable benefits for host communities. For this reason we participated in two projects in the EU Aid Volunteers initiative, a relatively new EU programme supporting the deployment of volunteers to countries where help is needed.

In practical terms, Red Cross deployed 30 volunteers from Europe in different countries, where they became part of pre- or post-disaster humanitarian aid operations. The volunteers received training before departure, and assignments were carefully chosen. Activities can only have a sustainable impact on local communities if they address real needs and gaps, and if volunteers work in a supportive and integrated manner with their local counterparts. This points to the importance of conducting a meaningful needs assessment, which involves the host community and the host organisation from the beginning. It also highlights the need for an effective mechanism for matching the volunteer and the assignment.

The Red Cross conclusions from the EU Aid Volunteers pilot projects were that international volunteering should be cost-effective, build upon existing national and international voluntary schemes without duplicating them, work within existing development plans, and focus on addressing concrete needs and gaps in the humanitarian field. Red Cross strongly believes that international volunteers should not be deployed to situations of armed conflict or violence. A more effective approach would be to support existing organisations with the specific mandate of working in these contexts and build local organisational capacity. Keeping these conclusions in mind,

initiatives like EU Aid Volunteers can have a distinct added value and provide benefit to all parties involved.

Nothing works without the local community

Humanitarian aid is often delivered to countries that also receive EU development support. This may be for a variety of reasons, including an unstable political context, a weak economy, poor infrastructure, and lack of respect for human rights and human lives. Here, development cooperation is a long-term process aimed at building a future for a region, a village, or a group of people. Humanitarian aid, on the other hand, is a short-term operation, a rapid response to an immediate emergency with the objective of alleviating human suffering and ensuring survival. Despite their differences, development cooperation and humanitarian aid are interconnected. Disasters wipe out development gains by taking lives and ruining prospects, often making the situation of already vulnerable people even worse. Similarly, poverty and vulnerability increase people's exposure to disasters as they have less mechanisms and resources in place to anticipate and recover from crises and shocks. Strengthening these capacities through disaster risk reduction and preparedness activities before, during and after disasters can help to protect development in the longer term. Humanitarian aid and development cooperation also share one fundamental principle: supporting local capacities is key.

In our experience, nothing works without the local community. The Red Cross Red Crescent approach to getting local communities on board is through volunteering.

"When conflict broke out in the area, the area was completely cut off and all the services stopped but the volunteers took over, providing what help they could, travelling through battle lines to bring relief to the people" (Red Crescent volunteer, Syria).



©European Commission, 2014

There is nothing more powerful than volunteers stepping up for their people.

"In the early days of Ebola, we couldn't get help, no-one else would do it, local volunteers were the only ones putting their hands up [...], we lost a lot of volunteers, particularly when we went into burying bodies, [...] but there were a lot too who said 'no-one else will do this, it has to be us, this is our community'" (Red Cross volunteer, West Africa).

Local volunteers are the driving force in many emergency operations. One important factor is scale. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Polio protection targeted two million people. In Ebola affected countries, operations reached out to three million people. In Syria, nine million people received support within a period of only two months. Any operation of scale and in a fragile context needs extensive networks of volunteers who know the region, the people, the routes and the places to go.

“The scale is a major thing, we have large numbers of [local] volunteers operating all over the country. Also they can move at pace, because of their local knowledge and their training, they know where and how to get things done quickly. We need this in operations this complex, for example, they know where the wells are, how to find petrol etc.” (Aid worker, West Africa).

Volunteers in need of support and care

Listening to the local volunteers, respecting them as the experts on site, giving them adequate infrastructure and the support they need to succeed with their important mission – this is, in very few words, the role of humanitarian organisations in emergency operations.

“Getting support is important, either from the people or from the [ed. Red Cross] National Society. We need equipment, tools, materials, team support, comradeship, support. If I go to do manage dead bodies I need the equipment and the training for it. If I don’t hear encouragement from the leaders, I will stop... even a little amount changes things” (Red Cross volunteer, West Africa).

In the midst of conflict and crisis, volunteers are confronted with plenty of threats and drawbacks. Day in, day out, on every mission volunteers are under pressure and at risk of being injured, infected, taken hostage or being fired at. Volunteer safety is a major issue for humanitarian organisations. Support, coordination and protection are vital to keeping them going and ensuring that others will continue to join and participate.

“We do a lot of work in IDP camps and other insecure environments and it creates problems for the volunteers [...], like we have bomb blasts and terrorists activities in different parts of the country. Like some of the volunteers [...] got killed, in addition there are some kidnapping cases and some other cases, so that made it difficult for organisations to work in the communities, so for us security is one of the main problems

we are facing” (Red Cross representative, South Asia).

At the same time, organisations need to respect and deal with the enormous physical and mental stress that volunteers are under. Volunteers may have been affected by the disaster themselves, coping with loss of family and friends, home and income.

“Our volunteers go out on a daily basis and are collecting bodies to return them to their families, in the last 18 months they have retrieved over 1,000 bodies, but it is not unusual for a volunteer to retrieve the body of someone they grew up with or went to school with, this goes on constantly” (Red Cross representative, Central African Republic).

How much can a volunteer take? When do pressure and stress become too much to bear? How much does she or he need the occupation as a way of coping with the surrounding chaos? Finding the correct balance between the needs of the volunteers, the requirements of the operation, and the inner workings of a humanitarian organisation is a difficult task for volunteer coordinators and managers.

For many of us, how volunteering can be ‘managed’ in the midst of an armed conflict is a mystery. Last March, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society proudly announced that 32 young volunteers in Al-Tall city completed an advanced training course, with another 24 volunteers undergoing the training in Quneitra in April. Training for volunteers? 20 minutes north of Damascus? With half the country overwhelmed by shootings and bombings? It turns out the training was in first aid, as in dealing with bleeding injuries, fractured bones and burns, administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and transporting injured people. It was also about social awareness in emergency situations. If anyone needs this kind of training it is those volunteers living with war and terror at their doorstep.



Advocating for humanitarian volunteering

Volunteering in a region affected by conflict or hit by a pandemic is an extraordinary form of civic engagement. It has been shown to help build social capital, growing trust and reciprocity in damaged environments. Moreover, it is a true act of bravery. Humanitarian volunteering saves lives, and brings support and comfort to those who need it most. Volunteering experts at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies identify eight advocacy points that are crucial for influencing humanitarian aid policies as well as decisions of governments and intergovernmental institutions such as the EU:

- Volunteer safety is considered carefully, factored into project budgets, monitored and reviewed throughout an entire project lifecycle.

- Sufficient time and resources need to be foreseen for training, preparing and supporting volunteers on humanitarian missions.
- Volunteers operating in conflict regions are provided with proper equipment, including personal protective equipment, and trained in the use of the equipment.
- Volunteer training is organised and monitored within the frame of a system that ensures that all volunteers have the skills and knowledge necessary for performing their missions safely.
- Humanitarian volunteers have free and safe access to victims of conflict and crisis. The opposing parties in the conflict agree to respect their neutrality and life-saving mission.
- Volunteers receive psychosocial support before, during and after missions, in particular in difficult or dangerous environments where volunteers are exposed to extreme pressure and stress.
- Volunteers are often themselves victims of disasters and conflicts. Support and care is offered when transitioning from periods of volunteer duty to 'regular' civilian life.

Authors

The **Red Cross Red Crescent** movement is a global humanitarian network with national member organisations in 189 countries, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 17 million volunteers are engaged in local community work in the areas of emergency assistance and civil protection, health and social care, migration and displacement, youth and volunteering. Further work is done in connection with safeguarding the Geneva Conventions, care and support for injured soldiers on the battlefield, prisoners of war, missing persons in armed conflicts, disaster preparedness, promotion of humanitarian principles and values. Movement activities are based on seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.



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CHAPTER 2

Social services and social protection in the European Union

Social Platform

Abstract

Developments over the last decade in social protection and social service provision in the EU have shown similar patterns. The first trend that can be observed is a tendency to 'externalise' social protection and service provision to the third sector and the social economy, and recently also to for-profit companies. Many consider social protection an obstacle to competitiveness. Social protection and universal access to services are called into question because of a lack of resources and systemic issues. The second trend can be described as a 'race to the bottom'. There has been a decrease in the level and duration of social benefits. Increased competition is pushing service providers to continuously reduce their costs, often resulting in a reduction in the quality of services delivered and a worsening of working conditions. External policies such as trade are also reinforcing the tendency to view public goods and services as commodities. The modernisation of social protection systems and services must not undermine people's rights and should guarantee a dignified life for all. In spite of, but also because of, the crisis, there is an opportunity to reinvent the European social model and put Europe on a stronger and fairer footing in the world.

European trends in social protection and social service provision

Everywhere in the EU the demand for social services is growing. This is largely due to demographic and societal changes: our population is ageing (European Commission, 2015, p.22) and one-person households are increasing (Eurostat, 2015a), leading to problems of isolation, especially amongst

older people. More women are in employment (Pissarides et al., 2005, p.71) while fewer informal careers are available for dependent family members (European Commission, 2003, p.5).

The economic crisis and increasing rates of unemployment (Eurostat, 2015b), poverty and social exclusion (Eurostat, 2015c) have also led to a greater demand for social services and social protection.

At the same time, expenditure for social services and social protection has been cut in many EU member states under austerity measures. The management of the economic crisis has led to badly targeted fiscal consolidation in the social sector. Short-term gains in terms of cost have been prioritised over long-term investment in both social protection systems and social services (Bouget, et al., 2015, pp.12-15). Income support has become less and less adequate, preventing people from living dignified lives and fully participating in society. In addition, fewer people have access to social benefits due to restricted coverage and tightened eligibility criteria (Ibid., pp.38-41).

The growing belief among member states that social protection systems and social services need modernising has created an increased focus on their effectiveness and efficiency. Social Platform believes that effectiveness means meeting users' needs and improving their lives; efficiency means optimising efforts and resources to achieve outcomes. Unfortunately, in most cases modernisation efforts are too centred on reducing service budgets.

Privatisation and competition in the social sector

In the context of growing social needs and decreasing public budgets, governments and public authorities are increasingly looking to the social economy¹, the third sector² and

¹ Social Economy Europe defines the social economy as economic and social players active in all sectors of economy and society. They are characterised principally by their aims and their methods: a different

businesses to assist with service provision. This is happening in two ways. Firstly, by encouraging private initiatives, governments and public authorities hope to alleviate pressure on public budgets. Secondly, by increasing competition among service providers in the belief that stronger competition will decrease the cost of services, they expect to improve the efficiency of public spending.



This trend is demonstrated by public procurement procedures launched to choose social service providers. In most cases, public authorities have awarded contracts simply by searching for the lowest price and ignoring other crucial considerations, such as quality and user involvement.

Aside from cost reduction, public authorities have sought other ways of encouraging competition amongst service providers.

One example is the use of social innovation. At first glance, this might seem positive. However, excessive focus on social innovation can lead to:

- Limiting public financing only to those practices that are considered innovative;

way of doing business which continuously associates public interest with economic performance and democratic operation.

² Definitions of the third sector vary, but third sector actors can be said to share the following attributes: They are all institutionally separate from government though they may have varying degrees of working relationships with the state; they all enjoy a significant degree of self-governance; and they all embrace some meaningful degree of voluntary involvement.

- Prioritising new actors over traditional well-established ones; and
- Jeopardising a comprehensive and long-term approach to social policies and services, including their financing.

Focus on social impact

For these reasons – and in the absence of a commonly agreed definition of social innovation at EU level – Social Platform believes that social innovation should only be taken into consideration if it has real social added value. This will reduce the risk of promoting and supporting approaches only because they are new.

Another example is the promotion of models that aim to achieve results in service provision in a more efficient and effective way. In some countries – particularly Anglo-Saxon ones – public authorities are employing a ‘payment by results’ method for social services, whereby providers are paid according to the outcomes they achieve, as opposed to the activities they carry out.

At EU level, a sub-group of the European Commission Group of Experts on Social Business (GECES) has developed a report on measuring the social impact achieved by social enterprises. Findings from the report have been used to develop impact measurement tools which have been applied to two funding instruments: the European Social Entrepreneurship Funds (EUSEF) and the axis on social entrepreneurship of the Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) programme. This could pave the way for the promotion of social impact measurement in the frame of other funding instruments, including at national level.

In addition, the G8 has published a report on impact investing, a new approach to funding the social sector. Social impact investing can be defined as investments into companies, organisations and funds with the intention of generating a measurable positive social impact alongside a financial return. Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are the most commonly

known instruments of social impact investing.

SIBs are innovative financial tools that require a complex process bringing together several actors. They differ from the classic public contract between a public authority and a service provider. With SIBs there are at least one or two additional parties involved: an intermediary (also known as the 'delivery agency') and one or more investors from the private sector. The public authority creates a contract with the intermediary in which it specifies the desired social outcome. The social intervention is not carried out directly by the intermediary, but by one or more service providers that are selected by the intermediary. The intermediary is also in charge of finding one or more investors to bear the financial risk of the intervention. The investor is paid back by the public authority only if the intervention results in the social outcomes set out in the contract and a return on investment.

In the EU, there have been 33 experiments with SIBs: 29 in the United Kingdom, and one each in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal (Ramsden, 2015). It is too early to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of SIBs as they are still in the early stages of experimentation. However, European Commissioner Elżbieta Bieńkowska, responsible for Internal Market and Services, recently announced that developing a market of social impact investing is one of her upcoming priorities.³

Trade agreements and the commodification of social services

Other recent developments affecting social services relate to the possible impact of trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), which are being negotiated by the EU, the United

States and other foreign countries. The current position of negotiators is that privately funded social and health services may be included in the scope of the agreements, meaning that they would be open to competition with foreign companies.

Social Platform is in regular contact with officials of the European Commission working on such trade agreements. Their questions to us focus on what problems would arise if foreign companies entered into competition with European ones in the provision of social and health services. The Commission believes that more competition among providers usually leads to lower costs, benefiting clients both financially and by giving them a greater choice.



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However, we argue that while this might be true for telecoms and other commercial services, the same cannot be said for social services. In the UK, there are examples of public-private partnerships set up to finance hospitals and care homes that have increased the cost of services, putting a strain on public budgets and having a negative impact on the social infrastructure. For-profit companies normally choose to invest in the most profitable social services, and in urban and wealthy areas, exacerbating inequalities between rural, peripheral and urban areas, and undermining social cohesion.

These examples point to a worrying trend towards the commodification of social services. Social services are increasingly being treated as commodities, while their role in securing social cohesion and inclusion is ignored, and the rights of beneficiaries are neglected.

³ See Commissioner Bieńkowska's answer to the question submitted by Sylvie Guillaume and Edouard Martin MEPs: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2015-002505&language=EN>.

Cooperation between different sectors can create positive outcomes. However, this should not encourage states to transfer their responsibilities to other actors, whether traditional (the social economy and the third sector) or new (businesses and private investors).

Conclusion

When public authorities decide not to provide services themselves or to use private money to fund them, they must bear the responsibility for setting the legal, financial and regulatory framework to ensure that everyone can access the services they need. This includes responsibility for setting strategic social service policy objectives, monitoring and evaluating the supply of services, and ensuring their availability and continuity, including in remote and rural areas and for users with complex needs.

We are facing a new reality: public authorities have less money, and new actors are entering the social arena. Relationships must be shaped in a way that guarantees quality social services for all. The same can be said for social protection. It is one thing to modernise social protection systems, and another entirely to question the right to adequate social protection. Boosting complementarity and interaction between social protection, the social economy and the third sector is a positive development, but this must not lead to member states transferring their responsibility for social protection to these actors.

The economic crisis has taught us an important lesson: investing in ambitious, integrated social policies – including social protection, social services and the social economy – should be a long-term strategy for member states and the EU. Focusing on prevention, while ensuring adequate protection for all, will guarantee both social progress and economic return while creating much needed jobs in social, health and care services.

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Bringing together 48 social NGOs, **Social Platform**'s values are grounded in a rights-based approach to ensuring that EU policies are developed in partnership with the people they affect, respecting fundamental rights, promoting solidarity and improving lives. Social Platform's mission is to advocate for, and raise awareness of, policies that bring social progress to all in the EU. We will achieve this by mobilising members and providing them with a strong voice with the aim of influencing European policy and legislation, because we believe that by changing words, we can change lives – especially those of people in vulnerable situations.



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CHAPTER 3

Europe and the road to gender equality

Alianza por la Solidaridad

Abstract

While the EU has placed itself at the forefront of the global fight for gender equality, there exists a sizeable gap between the commitments made by European leaders and reality: women still face tremendous barriers, and there is a lack of resources available for achieving gender equality. This chapter argues that a concerted effort is needed to achieve genuine equality both within and beyond the EU.

Introduction

Over the last 25 years, important progress has been made in the affirmation of women's rights, both politically and legally. The UN's 1994 Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and its 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing were key milestones in the process of refining the definition of women's rights and pushing for their integration into national legislation. However, the move from theory to practice has proved slower and more complicated than expected.

The beginning of the 21st century has witnessed the persistence of gender inequality, systematic discrimination and the continued violation of women's rights. Evidence of this is widely available. To mention some of the most striking examples, we have only to think of the 800 women who die in childbirth daily and the 8.5 million young women aged 15-24 years old who underwent dangerous and potentially fatal abortions in 2008 alone (UN, 2014, p.2).

Much of this data is the result of a tremendously unequal world, in which the gap between the so-called developed countries and the developing world, though decreasing, persists, while inequalities within

countries remain. We must remember that between 1998 and 2008 the wealth share of the world's poorest 70% stood at 3%, while the richest 5% controlled more than half of the world's wealth (UN, 2014, p.18). Europe is both a contributor to, and a product of, this structural inequality. For this reason, the EU and its citizens have a dual role to play. Within Europe, there must be concerted effort to close the gap between formal and substantive gender equality. Looking beyond European borders, foreign policy must prioritise the defence of women's rights.



Gender equality in Europe: from the formal to the substantive

Historically, many European countries were seen as beacons of gender equality, but today EU leaders are getting bogged down in rhetoric and failing to push for equality in real terms. European citizens are witnessing two realities. On the one hand, the past few years have seen substantial legislative and legal advances with regard to gender equality in the EU. Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty recognised gender equality as one of the fundamental values of the EU. In 2006, the EU adopted Directive 2006/54/CE on gender equality in the workplace. The establishment of the European Institute for Gender Equality in 2007, which produced a Gender Equality Index in 2013, is another example of progress in this area. On the other hand, Europe is far from achieving gender equality in real terms, due not least to lack of political vision. There are many obvious examples of this. There is no common system for reporting and gathering data on violence against women in the EU.

This is despite the fact that, in the EU, one in 10 women over the age of 15 have been victims of sexual violence, and one in 20 women have been victims of rape (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014, p.3). One in five women have been subjected to sexual or physical violence by a partner. One in 10 women under the age of 15 have been subjected to sexual violence by an adult. Of all of these, only 14% of partner cases, and 13% of non-partner cases, were reported (Ibid.).

The labour market is also deeply unequal. The European labour market is highly segregated, with 30% of women and 8% of men working in education and social services, sectors which have been hard hit by austerity measures and privatisation (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2015). Despite ongoing calls for a reduction in the gender wage gap, women earn on average 16%-20% less than men for performing the same job. 75% of single parent families in Europe are headed by women. While male single parents are employed in 80% of cases, only 65% of female single parents have a job, making them more vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion (Ibid.).

Men continue to dominate the political arena, occupying 77% of ministerial positions and 75% of parliamentary seats in 2012 (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2015). This gap is even wider when we look at the business and banking sectors, in which women occupy only 16% of seats on the boards of large companies and 17% of central bank positions (Ibid.).

Another facet of persistent gender inequality in Europe is the unequal distribution of unpaid care work. 44% of women in the European labour market dedicate a large portion of their time to the care of their children and grandchildren, compared to 27% of working men. This situation worsens when we look at domestic work, with 77% of working women dedicating one hour or more per day to domestic tasks, compared to 24% of working men. This has significant consequences for European women's

professional development as well as for their physical and mental health (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2015).

There is much data to show that women from ethnic minorities or migrant backgrounds are particularly likely to be subjected to various forms of discrimination. 54% of these women are in work, compared to 70% of men from similar backgrounds, accounting for a gender wage gap that is 5% higher than the European average (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2015).



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The lack of real political support for gender equality within the European establishment perpetuates these trends. And this, in a continent that has the economic and institutional means to make gender equality a reality. Feminist organisations are working at the European level to put pressure on decision makers to make this a priority. However, women's movements and feminist organisations work mainly at the national level, with considerable differences existing between countries. Two topics in particular have been taken up by a large number of European citizens: the gender wage gap and violence against women. It is the task of European civil society to unite citizens behind a common European vision for the eradication of gender inequality that transcends national agendas and represents a convergence of diverse social movements behind a single cause. This will put pressure on the EU and member states to progress at a rate that is consistent with their means.

Gender in European foreign policy

Looking beyond its borders, the EU has another role to play. While the EU has had a strong role in defending women's rights in the context of high level international decision making, including in Beijing and Cairo, and during negotiations around SDGs, its role in pushing this agenda on a geopolitical level has been minimal. Despite being the biggest development aid donor in the world, its role in development cooperation has been insufficient, with the exception of some member states that have good bilateral development policies.

The 2005-2010 Gender Action Plan (GAP) has had a short political lifespan and proved relatively inefficient. Receiving insufficient support, it failed to place gender equality at the centre of European foreign policy (CONCORD, 2015, p.1).



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Due to a lack of resources, there was a failure to attain the objectives set out by GAP and put together foreign delegations with the capacity to work transversally, develop gender sensitive budgets and implement the gender index. European cooperation is characterised by a failure to adequately monitor the management of funds, initiatives and impact in terms of gender equality. This, combined with a failure to focus official development aid and other funds on gender issues, makes the realisation of political commitments abroad even more unlikely.

In May 2015, the Council of the EU recognised these difficulties in its conclusions on Gender in Development,

calling for a renewal of the EU's political commitment to women's rights (Council of the EU, 2015, p.3). However, GAP 2016-2020 has not yet received the political push it needs (no official communication has been issued), nor has a budget for it been outlined. This will make the task of placing gender issues at the heart of European development cooperation difficult. It will also be hard to establish the coordination and leadership necessary to forging a common European approach to development cooperation.

Non-governmental development organisations, represented by CONCORD and other networks such as AIDWATCH, have been monitoring adherence to gender and development commitments, but they have not been successful in pushing for their enforcement, especially with regard to sexual and reproductive rights. Without sufficient pressure, it is unlikely that there will be substantial progress in the implementation of the gender agenda in the coming years.

The role of volunteers

In the framework of the sustainable development agenda, volunteering, combined with the notion of active citizenship, can play a strategic role. Volunteers' contributions can range from protecting global public goods to calling for greater government accountability. From this perspective, volunteering represents an opportunity for European citizens to play a role in promoting the attainment of SDGs and gender equality. To take advantage of this opportunity, CSOs will have to dedicate time and resources to supporting volunteers, creating opportunities for engagement and forging alliances outside their traditional fields of work. Women can play a central role in pressuring the EU to live up to its commitment to gender equality in Europe and beyond. Even though volunteering varies substantially from one European country to another, volunteering is an activity in which men and women engage in equal measure.

Conclusion

But, the road does not end here. In the past 25 years, the global context has changed radically. We live in an increasingly heterogeneous, deregulated world, with diffuse power structures and with new ideas regarding gender categorisation. However, global solutions have not changed. We are paralysed. We have to create political change while putting pressure on the EU and its member states to live up to their commitments. Europe is on the road to gender equality, but it still has a long way to go.

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CHAPTER 4

Sustainable development and combating climate change

Alianza por la Solidaridad

Abstract

This chapter aims to outline the minimum requirements for an adequate international climate change agreement. It argues that any climate agreement must be aligned with development aspirations and the post-2015 development agenda goals while respecting the biophysical limits of the planet.

Introduction

For many, the past few months have been dominated by the race to formulate SDGs that are acceptable to all stakeholders and end the year in Paris⁴ with a sufficiently ambitious international climate change agreement. This was particularly important given the disappointing outcomes of the Bonn Climate Change Conference in August.

Over the years, it has become increasingly clear that a gap exists between the bubble of UN decision making and the outside world. UN negotiations are regulated by the rules of consensus and built around values of equality and shared responsibility. Meanwhile, the global geopolitical reality is characterised by a fierce fight for resources, economic competition between countries and a global shift toward a carbon-intensive lifestyle. In short, while there are a number of events and external dynamics that have had, and continue to have, a decisive impact on the world in which we live, these seem to be excluded from current climate change negotiations.

As early as the first Gulf War, the foundations of the capitalist model and the

⁴ The new international climate change agreement will be adopted at the UN Climate Change Conference, also referred to as COP21 or CMP11, in Paris in December 2015.

carbon-intensive style of growth which sustained the development of industrialised countries were firmly established. Today, changes in the geopolitical world order are evident, but the inclusion of emerging countries in the new world order has not led to significant advances in development. In the case of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), rising internal demand combined with a heavy reliance on hydrocarbon exports has driven national governments to implement both conventional and non-conventional strategies of resource exploitation (Honty and Gudynas, 2015, p.6). These extractive activities are responsible for producing large quantities of greenhouse gases and put tremendous pressure on ecosystems (BP, 2014). Against this backdrop, increased use of natural resources in general, and energy sources in particular, is pushing us closer to the brink of the planet's physical and ecological limits. The depletion of fossil fuels and global warming are two of the most significant factors affecting the future of our planet.



Any discussion on combating global warming should not be based on scientific evidence alone; geopolitical and development models must be taken into account.

It is about our future

The cost of decarbonising the economy, as well as opportunities for technological innovation and energy transition to address issues of unemployment and industrial restructuring, are not being considered in mainstream approaches to climate governance. This is not a trivial matter: we

should be addressing the crisis of development models and the hegemony of developed countries in the geopolitical world order.

It does not make sense to separate the real world from the practice of global governance during climate negotiations. Nor does it make sense to separate climate patterns and the consequences of climate change from other global problems, such as matters of energy, health, security, development and international trade. These problems will have a significant impact on the future of humanity and the planet, and they should be given due consideration during discussions on climate governance.

In recent years, one of the most important advances in the field of energy generation has been the unprecedented increase in renewable energy production, especially solar and wind power. The International Energy Agency claims that, in 2014, global emissions stopped rising for the first time in 40 years. This is attributed mainly to advances in renewable energy, particularly in China. Meanwhile, climate negotiations focus on long-term emissions scenarios, while treating issues of energy production and sources only indirectly. Development models and the transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy do not feature enough in the climate agenda, despite ongoing calls from civil society and some national governments.

Sustainable development: not just a question of economic growth

If it is to meet the challenges facing humanity, climate policy should not only reduce the share of fossil fuels in the energy matrix, but it should also avoid increasing hydrocarbon exploitation (Honty and Gudynas 2015, p.22). Some BRICS countries are focusing on increasing the volume of their reserves and their extraction capacity, particularly for unconventional petroleum and gas, which produce higher greenhouse gas emissions than their conventional counterparts. This undermines the climate

agenda and compromises the goal of keeping global warming under 1.5 degrees Celsius (IPCC, 2014, Synthesis Report).



Latin America is heavily affected by climate change. It is also one of the most progressive regions when it comes to climate negotiations, acting as an important conduit between stakeholders. However, there is much division within the sub-continent, with individual countries aligning themselves with a number of different groups, such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), LMDC (The Like Minded Group of Developing Countries) and AILA (Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean).

The reality is that many countries define development as economic growth, maintaining that it can be sustained indefinitely and will lead to improvements in social welfare, notably through increased consumption. Economic growth results from increases in investment and exports. Social welfare is increasingly associated with purchasing power, leading to the monetisation of complex matters such as social justice and ecosystem goods and services.

Many proposals for combating climate change are based on strategies which secure economic growth and therefore often end up actually perpetuating the problems they seek to address. Thus, it is not about putting a price on nature to generate new goods; it is about starting to implement more radical measures to put an end to the ecological crisis.

The EU has lowered its aspirations and ceded its leading role in climate negotiations. Its proposal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, is far from the 60% needed to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. In the eyes of many CSOs, the EU has not been able to put forward a concrete proposal for an Energy Union, which would see an orderly departure from its addiction to fossil fuels (Cantero, 2015, pp.57-71).

Policy coherence: from New York to Paris

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the USA and the EU will serve to further entrench an economic model that advocates unlimited growth driven by fossil fuel exploitation, and is damaging to both people and planet. The European Commission itself recognises that, by further incentivising transatlantic transport, TTIP will cause an increase in carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions.

TTIP will also give energy multinationals more power to disregard the will of citizens and push for the continued exploitation of 'dirty energy' and the use of dangerous techniques such as fracking, while impeding shifts towards renewable energy (Capaldo, 2014, p.8).

It does not make sense to promote the reduction of CO₂ emissions while, at the same time, signing economic treaties (such as TTIP) which will seriously compromise climate goals. Such policy incoherence is irresponsible.

The summits in Paris and New York offer a unique opportunity to align the SGDs with climate goals. To this end, the Paris climate agreement should include a commitment to fund the transition towards low-carbon economies, particularly in developing countries.

A new kind of climate agreement

The climate agreement to be adopted in Paris in December 2015 will have to represent a real departure from previous agreements. In the early years of top-down climate negotiations, attention was focused on establishing international goals that would drive national action. Over time, the international community has moved towards a more bottom-up approach: each country presents its own goals and plans for carbon reduction.

Failure to reach a sufficiently ambitious climate agreement will spell catastrophe for the future of the planet and humankind. To give a geographically-close example, the agricultural, fishing and tourism industries of Southern Europe, and Spain in particular, will suffer under the effects of climate change, resulting in the loss of millions of euros and jobs.



Rising temperatures, combined with declining rainfall, will have a devastating impact, causing the extinction of flora and fauna, which do not always have a strong ability to migrate, adapt and transform in rural areas.

Damage to nature will have a knock-on effect on economic sectors such as agriculture, fishing and tourism (IPCC, 2015). The production of wine and citrus fruit, essential for the Spanish economy, will be seriously affected.

Until now, CSOs have welcomed the progress in negotiations with new work

approaches. However, we now believe that a global agreement is needed, one which guarantees that the contributions promised by countries involve activities that are sufficient for global action and provide corresponding financial support for developing countries' transition to low carbon economies. Moreover, as CSOs, we call on all stakeholders to ensure that negotiations are transparent and cooperative.

A good agreement must ensure that this generation does not commit ecocide and, as a consequence, commit genocide. The agreement should establish emission reduction targets for developed and developing countries alike. The world is not an 'open bar' until 2030 as some people have tried to claim.

Now, civil society is calling for an ambitious international climate change agreement that includes the following:

- Leaving 80% of known fossil fuel reserves in the ground;
- Having clear objectives to reduce worldwide emissions by 44 Gt of CO₂e by 2020, 40 Gt by 2025 and 35 Gt by 2030, thereby ensuring that the threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius is not surpassed;
- Introducing strong long-term commitments in the post-2020 climate change agenda, including a commitment to eliminate fossil fuel emissions and move to 100% renewable energy use by 2050;
- Reducing defence spending (more than 1 500 000 million dollars globally) and channelling those resources into supporting climate change adaptation in developing countries;
- Avoiding false solutions such as carbon markets and geoengineering; and
- Recognising, respecting, promoting and guaranteeing the rights of people and nature in practice, including with respect to the concepts of damage and loss.

The agreement in Paris must include: a ratifiable core legal agreement; a package of decisions from COP; and annexes and/or complementary tools for its implementation.

It is crucial the people understand how climate change affects them. Climate change has a tremendous impact on the planet and therefore on human activity. Climate change negotiations should not just concern scientists and national environment ministers. National leaders must, together with finance and development sector representatives, secure the future of the planet and humankind. Hopefully this time they will step up to meet citizens' expectations.

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CHAPTER 5

Volunteers for peace and security

Peace Brigades International

Abstract

Looking at the specific case of Peace Brigades International's volunteer-based international accompaniment model, this article explores the role of international volunteering in strengthening and extending the peace and security objectives of the post-2015 agenda. By first recognising that volunteers are key agents of change, the article continues by illustrating how volunteering for peace in fragile and conflict affected environments can bring about long-lasting social and structural change and improve the security of human rights defenders and CSOs. The article explores how and under what circumstances the post-2015 agenda and volunteer-based organisations work in favour of peace and how they can support each other to enhance peace and security.

Introduction

For the first time in history, the majority of the world's poorest live in a small group of conflict-affected and fragile states. Not one of these states is on track for achieving the MDGs (The World Bank, 2011), which were set to be attained by 2015. The post-2015 development agenda has revised priorities for global development policy, and a recent report recognises that peacebuilding is necessary "to ensure social justice, equity and sustained prosperity for all people" (Wild and Bergh, 2013, p. 1).

Peace Brigades International (PBI), an international human rights organisation, has worked for almost 35 years in countries with violent conflict, political instability and societal fragility, supporting nonviolent peace initiatives led by members of civil society. This article aims to explore how and

to what extent the PBI volunteer-based international accompaniment model can provide a resilient, innovative and nonviolent alternative to promote peace, while informing and strengthening peace and security objectives in the post-2015 agenda.

Peace and security in the post-2015 agenda

The UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda recognised that the absence of goals related to peace, security, human rights and justice was a weakness of the MDG initiative (UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012). At PBI, we believe that the negotiations on the post-2015 framework create an opportunity to incorporate these goals into the final post-2015 agenda and tailor the definition of peace and security.

Nonviolent international interventions have the potential to help ensure that peace and security figure prominently in the post-2015 agenda if they directly support local nonviolent peace initiatives. These external interventions can protect and empower local human rights defenders and organisations by working on conflict transformation in fragile contexts and environments. Interventions can range from observing human rights situations to accompanying human rights defenders to raising international awareness through high-level advocacy activities.

The peace and security agenda and the post-2015 interventions should be infused with a commitment to the principle of nonviolence. Nonviolent actions contribute to conflict transformation by creating long-lasting social and structural change that is grounded in a human rights ethic, rejects neo-colonialism and respects local initiatives. International volunteers play a significant role in the nonviolent movement, actively engaging in transformative actions and reinforcing grassroots efforts.

PBI endorses a broad definition of peace and security, and regularly operates in conflict

areas that are not recognised as such by local governments and/or the international community. We do not define peace as the absence of war and armed conflict. Rather, our understanding of peace is grounded in the principles of nonviolence, non-partisanship and non-interference, and incorporates human rights concepts. Our understanding of security is based on the UN Commission on Human Security's definition of human security: "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment" (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4). The diversity of contexts in which PBI works is demonstrative of the broad understanding of peace that PBI uses to guide its intervention decisions. The nature of conflicts is changing, and in recent years the number of intra-state conflicts and civil wars, involving non-state actors such as rebels, gangs and organised crime, has increased (von Einsiedel, et al., 2014). The causes of violence are multiple, including political, economic, social and environmental issues. We have found that control of resources and land is one of the main causes of present-day conflicts. These kinds of conflicts pose new challenges that are different from those posed by traditional inter-states conflicts, and the international response has been neither sufficient nor appropriate. PBI's model of protective accompaniment and peacebuilding has proven effective in these contexts (assuming that the model's other conditions are met). PBI hopes that the post-2015 agenda will adopt an inclusive and far-reaching definition of peace and recognise disputes about access to resources as one of the main drivers of present-day conflicts.

In a recent report to the UN Secretary General, the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda stated that "[t]he multidimensionality of the drivers of the conflicts, also implies that addressing them requires a multidimensional approach that spans the development, political, security and justice areas. The different dimensions are interdependent. You cannot solve one without solving the other" (UN System Task Team, 2012, p. 4). We think that

PBI's intervention strategies are not only in line with the post-2015 agenda but also have the potential to create the peaceful environment necessary to the implementation of development goals.



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The PBI approach and the post-2015 agenda can mutually reinforce each other by supporting the proliferation of peace movements and nonviolent interventions, creating synergies and generating lasting change.

With the link between peace and security, on the one hand, and development, on the other, now being acknowledged, peace and security are set to feature prominently in the post-2015 agenda, with the UN Task Team on Peace and Security suggesting that "[t]he post-2015 framework should include separate goals related to peace and security and a clear, concise and measurable target on violence, which can be measured through indicators on battle-related deaths and intentional homicide" (UN System Task Team, 2012, p. 3).

The post-2015 agenda should recognise that the resolution and prevention of conflict and violence is a precondition for the implementation of other development objectives. PBI calls for a post-2015 framework that is built on a broader understanding of peace and recognises the role of volunteers in supporting people to enjoy peace, security and human rights.

The PBI volunteer-based international accompaniment model

In the context of the post-2015 agenda negotiations, the PBI volunteer-based

international accompaniment model presents an innovative yet proven approach to sustainable and resilient peacebuilding (Coy, 2001). The three operating principles of this model are non-violence, non-interference and non-partisanship. International volunteers are integral to upholding these principles as they carry out their work in the field.

To give a brief overview of the operating principles of the PBI model, **nonviolence** is both a criteria used in selecting organisations to accompany and the attitude espoused by the volunteers themselves. PBI works by invitation only, going into countries and working with organisations and communities once a formal request for international accompaniment has been presented, evaluated and approved. The organisations and communities themselves must be committed to using only nonviolent measures when defending and exercising their human rights. Similarly, the international volunteers must also be trained in and committed to nonviolence.

The **non-interference** principle refers to the accompaniment aspect of the PBI model. International volunteers deter violence with their international presence, walking alongside human rights defenders while they do their work, and staying in communities that are at risk of threats and attacks by state or para-state actors. PBI volunteers do not interfere with the actual work that accompanied organisations and communities carry out because the people that PBI accompanies are best placed to defend their human rights and bring about social and structural change (Gilchrist, 2000; Reeler, et al., 2009).

The last principle speaks to PBI's treatment of state actors as well as its criteria for selecting organisations to accompany. PBI is committed to being **non-partisan** in its actions and communications, and does not take a political position on local or national debates. As such, when PBI volunteers visit local and national government and military authorities, diplomatic corps, UN bodies and

their own embassies, they share their concerns about the human rights situation in terms of civil society discourse and international agreements, and not in terms of political priorities or discourse. PBI volunteers do not express political stances or participate in political actions outside of their work, as their dedication to non-partisanship is a full-time commitment. Additionally, the organisations and communities that PBI accompanies must also be non-partisan and not affiliated with any political party or movement.



Currently, PBI has international accompaniment projects in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Kenya, and delivers innovative human rights monitoring and training programs in Nepal and Indonesia. **International volunteers** make up the large majority of field teams, accounting for 70% of field personnel on average. PBI volunteers are generally young to middle-aged professionals with experience in human rights advocacy and often with relevant graduate studies. The nationalities of field team volunteers are purposefully diverse, with special attention paid to having a broad range of northern as well as southern nationalities present. The ratio of volunteers to staff gives greater **legitimacy and efficacy** to PBI's work.

Volunteers are drawn to PBI because they share its objectives and values. Volunteers are dedicated to promoting peace and security, and also appreciate that PBI operations are wholly respectful of the agency and capacity of local human rights defenders.

Lastly, the convergence between PBI's objectives and values, and those of its international volunteers contributes to the efficacy of PBI field operations due to the internal practice of **consensus-based decision-making**. When PBI volunteers participate in horizontal decision-making, this 'sharedness' generates decisions that are more informed and resilient (Polletta, 2002; Gaventa, 2006). The horizontal nature of field teams allows for more free and equitable discussion, resulting in decisions that are based on more information and thorough analysis. Volunteers who share the same values are also capable of making decisions that can better buffer small changes in the political climate of their work, and that can be flexible if the changes are more significant and/or immediate (Briggs, 2000; Hogan, 2002).

Volunteering in the area of peace and protection requires comprehensive and meticulous preparation. PBI volunteers participate in mandatory and comprehensive training that starts prior to their departure and continues throughout their field placement, so that they have the knowledge and skills needed to provide protective accompaniment to human rights defenders and communities in fragile and conflict affected environments.

Case study: the midnight phone call

The following is a first-hand account by former PBI volunteer Erika Zárate of an accompaniment in Colombia.

It was close to midnight on the 21st of February, 2005, when the phone call arrived. The international volunteer on call for phone and email communication that night immediately recognised the voice of Pedro (name changed), one of the leaders that we accompanied in the peace community of San Jose de Apartado in northern Colombia. He was clearly distressed, and whispered hurriedly, "I think there has been a massacre in La Resbalosa hamlet. You must come now, and bring as many *brigadistas* (PBI volunteers) as you can. We leave at dawn to

find out what happened, and we need you to be with us in case there is more violence." We were six volunteers in the shared PBI home and office in northern Colombia, with six other volunteers in the field, but none near to where the alleged massacre had taken place.

Upon receiving this emergency request for accompaniment, we made phone calls to the other three PBI field teams as well as the international office in London, UK. During these phone calls, rapid-fire consensus was taken as to whether this was an assignment that we could accept or not. The resulting consensus was yes... if. If we were able to communicate with and receive support from the embassies of the two volunteers heading to the possible massacre site. If the military working the area could be informed of our presence in the area. And if the national government, ideally the vice-president of Colombia, could be informed about and secure our presence in the area.

By 5:00am that morning, the PBI team had made key phone calls to government and the diplomatic corps, in order to increase the protection and well-being of the volunteers in the field. The PBI Colombia Project had selected myself (a Canadian) and a Spanish volunteer to accompany the delegation of peace community members to La Resbalosa, given the support of our embassies, our experience in the region, and our gender diversity. Two more PBI volunteers were set to join us in 24-hours, in order to have more international presence in the field and different embassies informed. Thanks to PBI support network, three international aid workers representing two international NGOs allied with PBI also joined the delegation. Our task was to walk with the local peace delegation through six hours of mountainous rainforest terrain in order to ascertain what had happened in the small hamlet of three local families.

Within an hour of receiving the communication from national government, the delegation had assembled in the town centre of San Jose de Apartado, ready to depart on the long trek to La Resbalosa. The

delegation was composed of 100 members of the peace community, a Colombian human rights lawyer, a Colombian photojournalist and five internationals, including the PBI volunteers. Along the way to the hamlet, we saw numerous armed military and paramilitary personnel, but no one threatened either the community members or the international companions until we reached La Resbalosa. At the hamlet, we were initially blocked entry by young military troops armed with machetes and machine guns pointed at us, but when my PBI colleague and I introduced ourselves and showed our passports and the faxes from our embassies and from the vice-president's office, the full delegation was then permitted passage into the hamlet. Once again, the PBI model proved to be effective both in dissuading violence and in protecting the people we accompany.



As PBI volunteers, we accompanied the leaders of the peace community, the lawyer and the photojournalist while they searched for the missing families. Over the course of that day and the next, we found the brutalised remains of five adults and three young children. A forensic team arrived on the afternoon of the first day, and we also bore witness to their investigation.

During the accompaniment, we regularly phoned our PBI office with updates, using our satellite phone. It was observed, and was later proved during criminal sentences, that both state and paramilitary troops had been involved in the torture and murder of the families of La Resbalosa, on order to gain access to their strategically located and

resource-rich land for military and corporate reasons and in order to terrorise the surrounding families into leaving their land as well.

It was early on the second morning that we received a petition from community members to accompany them as they checked on the safety of the families living in a neighbouring hamlet. Given that we had two incoming PBI volunteers arriving who were closer to the hamlet, it was agreed by consensus that they would visit this hamlet first before meeting us at the massacre site of La Resbalosa. It was a both a fortunate and well-informed decision, as the new pair of PBI volunteers were able to reach the neighbouring hamlet in time to stop the violent interrogation and death threats made by military and paramilitary troops against the trapped villagers.

After this massacre, my PBI colleagues and I accompanied peace community members during an extensive tour of the relevant government and military offices, UN offices and embassies to share what we had all witnessed. What emerged from this high level international attention was more continuous presence and accompaniment by PBI of the Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado, as well as an ongoing increase in international support. This has provided greater security for local human rights defenders to continue their work to seek truth and justice for this massacre and for the 150 other members of its community who had been assassinated prior to the massacre, and of the dozen who have been killed since (Drost, 2010). More concrete impacts of the joint local and international pressure include the formal recognition of the peace community as a humanitarian zone, and the sentencing of military personnel involved in the massacre (PBI Colombia, 2010; Verdad Abierta, 2012).

From my experience, it is clear that international volunteers have an impact in advancing peace and security in conflict-affected areas. However, in the case of the peace community of San Jose de Apartado,

numerous other human rights violations still remain in impunity, warranting an ongoing role for international volunteers to play in accompanying peace community members as they continue their nonviolent labour for peace, justice and self-sufficiency.⁵

PBI volunteers and the peace and security objectives of the post-2015 agenda

Since 2010, the UN is increasingly recognising volunteering as an important component in the range of strategies aimed at building peace in post-conflict situations (UNDG, 2013). Volunteer contributions can be described as both formal and informal. On the one hand, PBI's volunteers contribute formally in that they are recognised international actors with legitimacy in front of the national authorities who collaborate with international organisations and other key players. Thus, volunteers are officially recognised as providing protection and support to nonviolent local movements, documenting and reporting on the human rights situation in their host country and preventing violence. On the other hand, volunteers contribute informally, acting as key agents of change motivating other actors and promoting the principle of nonviolence. This informal social influence affects governance processes and brings about change. Although this effect is indirect, its potential remains crucial.

In the context of the post-2015 agenda, PBI's volunteers can fulfil an important bridging role, connecting local peace movements to international ones. Volunteering can also contribute to the creation of new networks for peace. Giving international visibility to the work of local human rights defenders has proven to be an effective strategy for increasing security and protection. Despite

the changeable nature of today's conflicts, models of intervention based on volunteering can easily and quickly adapt to the needs of the context. Also, the deployment of a team of volunteers is still relatively fast despite the extensive security measures that need to be put in place, especially when PBI already has an established presence within a country.

As internationals who are not involved in local dynamics, PBI volunteers easily cross borders and dialogue with different parties: CSOs, human rights defenders, international actors and governmental bodies, including the armed forces.

The PBI model, like that of other volunteer-based organisations, is efficient: the value for money is very high because with a small amount of money it is possible to achieve big and lasting results.

Increasing the impact not only of PBI's volunteers but of all international volunteers working to advance peace requires comprehensive support that goes beyond economic assistance and includes political support. CSOs and citizens can express political support in a number of ways: actors can become members of PBI's national groups; raise human rights concerns with local and national governments, and asking them to prioritise nonviolent movements in favour of peace; take part in thematic or geographic campaigns; or join platforms and networks in favour of peace.

It is widely recognised that nonviolent actions in favour of peace have a stronger impact when they are part of a more comprehensive global movement.

Starting a movement for peace could be a successful strategy with the post-2015 agenda for peace and security. If the post-2015 agenda prioritises peace and security with a nonviolent approach, this could pave the way for starting a powerful movement for peace with volunteer-involving CSOs like PBI.

⁵ For more information on the case of the San José de Apartado Massacre, please read: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/16/san-jose-apartado-massacr_n_501243.html or watch: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OebfmB7eFcE>.

Conclusions and recommendations

It remains to be seen how peace and security will ultimately figure in the post-2015 development agenda and to what extent the role of volunteering in actively supporting peace and security will be acknowledged.

One essential question that still needs to be addressed in the post-2015 agenda is how to support local agents of peace, namely human rights defenders and CSOs? A small international organisation such as PBI supports them by providing integral accompaniment and protection, opening spaces for them to develop their work. But the UN post-2015 agenda can do much more.

We think further steps need to be taken to improve peace and security in the context of the post-2015 agenda. We recommend:

- Including targets for violence reduction in the post-2015 agenda;
- Including attacks on human rights defenders, and nonviolent movements and organisations in the list of 'grave and tragic' manifestations of violence that need to be addressed, recognising that these actors are targeted because of their potential to bring about change;
- Creating a stand-alone goal related to peace that defines peace in a holistic way and not only as the absence of war;
- Framing the interventions and goals for peace and security within the philosophy of nonviolence and avoiding armed interventions as a strategy for conflict resolution;
- Addressing the drivers of conflict, such as control over land and natural resources;
- Supporting nonviolent local, national and international movements;
- Giving voice to the people affected by conflict and to civil society in conflict-affected and fragile states;
- Taking a gender sensitive approach to peace and security; and
- Dedicating funds to peace and security to enable the deployment of international volunteers.

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Peace Brigades International (PBI) is an international NGO that has been promoting nonviolence and protecting human rights since 1981. PBI work is based on the principles of non-partisanship and non-interference in the internal affairs of the accompanied organizations. PBI envisions a world in which people address conflicts non-violently, where human rights are universally upheld and social justice and intercultural respect have become a reality. PBI works to open a space for peace in which conflicts can be dealt with non-violently using a strategy of international presence and concern that supports local initiatives and contributes to developing a culture of peace and justice. PBI acts on request of local non-violent groups working for human rights and social change in regions where there is oppression and conflict. The aim of PBI's international presence is to accompany both political and social processes through a joint strategy of deterring violence and promoting active non-violence.



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CHAPTER 6

Human rights and migration

Jara Henar and Paula Señán

Abstract

The ‘Fortress Europe’ approach to migration is clearly not working. Europe is failing to address the root causes of displacement and find solutions that respect human rights. Civil society’s response to the humanitarian crisis unfolding within and beyond Europe’s borders is manifold. It includes mobilising citizens; monitoring political, legislative and judicial decisions; pushing for transnational solidarity; and, in some cases, exercising disobedience.

Introduction

As recent events have shown, migration is a very broad and complex issue. The EU is both internationally recognised for its human rights credentials, but also associated with the image of ‘Fortress Europe’, spending millions of euros to increase border security while thousands die trying to reach its shores⁶.

This chapter considers this paradox. It introduces some elements of the international human rights system, relating it to migration management in the EU and the refugee crisis that erupted this year in the heart of Europe. It also discusses the role that civil society is already playing and can still play in creating an enabling environment for the realisation of rights in migration.

A right to migrate?

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), one of the founding texts of the international human rights system, states that:

⁶ According to the *Missing migrants* project, almost 2,900 people died between 1st January and 2nd October 2015 trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea: <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/>

“Everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” (UN, 1948, Art.2)

Human rights have a universal character⁷: everyone – including migrants – is entitled to them. It is the duty of every state, “regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UN, 1993).



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The UDHR does not include the right to migrate as such. But, of all the documents that make up the international system of human rights, it is the one that comes closest to doing so. Article 13 states that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state” and that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country” (UN, 1948). The Declaration, while recognising the right to internal freedom of movement, does not guarantee the right to international freedom of movement. Though it recognises the right to emigrate, i.e. leave a state, it makes no reference to the right to immigrate, i.e. enter another state. The right to emigrate, without the corresponding right to immigrate, is rendered void. And so, the Declaration

⁷ The universality of human rights was pointed out in the UDHR and subsequently reiterated by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), which states that all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/OHCHR20/VDPA_booklet_English.pdf

cannot be said to enshrine the right to migrate.

That being said, Article 14 of the UDHR (1948) provides that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”, without making any reference, implicit or explicit, to restriction of movement. This is not surprising given that, although the international human rights system does not recognise the right to migrate as such, it does recognise the right to seek asylum, as set out in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

It is not the aim of this chapter to carry out an in-depth analysis of the differences and similarities between the treatment of migrants and refugees in the EU. Rather, this chapter will focus on a few key issues.

One of the main similarities we can find is that EU member states are failing in their obligation to respect and protect the rights of migrants⁸, refugees and asylum seekers⁹. This has long been the case in the management of the humanitarian crisis at the ‘doors’ of the EU, but it also became a reality within the EU’s borders.

On the other hand, while both asylum seekers and migrants have suffered human

rights violations, one of the potential risks we identify is the increased criminalisation of migrants, especially those who enter the EU irregularly. What is new about the current situation is the portrayal of migrants as ‘negative’, ‘bad’ or ‘criminal’, compared to the depiction of asylum seekers as ‘positive’, ‘good’ or ‘victim’.

In this regard, we applaud the position of the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, a very progressive treaty which unfortunately has not been signed or ratified by any EU member state – or by any country in the global north¹⁰.

In a statement released in September 2015, the CMW called on states to refrain from reacting to the multidimensional and complex movement of people currently seen in the EU “through criminalization of irregular migration, building of fences and strengthening other border controls measures, including detention, push-back and deportation practices” (CMW, 2015). Such measures, which do little to guarantee the protection of migrants’ rights, are commonplace in the Union.

Migration and security

As we have seen, the management of current migratory flows by the EU clearly shows the contradiction between the ‘Europe of Rights’ and ‘Fortress Europe’.

On 3 and 4 October 2013, as more than 300 people died off the Italian island of Lampedusa, the Second High-level Dialogue

⁸ For a discussion on the human rights violations committed at EU borders, see the report “Human Rights in the Southern Border 2015”, by the Pro Human Rights Association of Andalusia (APDHA), at <http://www.apdha.org/media/informe-fs2015-web.pdf> (in Spanish). Also significant is the communication submitted by René Cassin Committee in June 2015 to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), criticising the direct discrimination that sub-Saharan migrants face in Spain, where they are prevented from exercising their right to asylum. The communication was presented on behalf of a Malian migrant, Abdoulaye Mara, who attempted to cross the border in Melilla on 11th March 2015 to seek asylum but was immediately pushed back to Morocco: http://picum.org/en/news/bulletins/48089/news_48007

⁹ On 23rd September 2015, the European Commission adopted 40 infringement decisions against several member states due to their failure to apply the Common European Asylum System: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5699_en.htm

¹⁰ The convention can be found at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CMW.aspx>. The failure of EU and other developed countries to sign and ratify the convention implies that migrants working in these countries are not under the convention’s protection. See https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TRATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en

on International Migration and Development was taking place at the UN headquarters in New York. At the meeting, Cecilia Malmström, then European Commissioner for Home Affairs, declared the EU and its member states' commitment to migrants' human rights, regardless of their status (Cecilia Malmström, 2013).

She also called for the ratification of international human rights instruments and for the protection of migrants' human rights to remain a cross-cutting policy priority. Finally, she noted the importance of protecting migrants in distress, or facing dire humanitarian or life-threatening situations, whether while *en route* or during their stay in host countries (Ibid.).



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Unfortunately, in the two years since these statements were made, we have not seen progress in the protection of migrants' human rights. Instead, we have witnessed a strengthening of the security approach, or, more aptly, the 'insecurity approach'. An example of this is the website of the current Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, which highlights policies such as "Industry for Security", "Police Cooperation", "Crisis and Terrorism", "Irregular Migration and Return", and "Organised Crime and Human Trafficking"¹¹.

Another manifestation of this security approach is the European Agenda on

Migration (European Commission, 2015a), presented in 2015 and outlining the EU's strategy on migration management (European Council, 2015). The priorities are very similar to those of the 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) (European Commission, 2011): to facilitate legal migration, to fight illegal migration and to improve asylum policy. But, significantly, the 2015 Agenda includes the addition of border management measures, notably fighting trafficking networks, implementing return policies, strengthening the border control agency Frontex, creating Union standards on borders, and reinforcing third countries' border management capacities.

Active citizenship and the post-2015 agenda

Given its perceived strategic importance, the current humanitarian crisis is being managed under the umbrella of the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015b). CSOs largely coincide in their criticism of the agenda: the security approach does not solve the situation and is not compatible with a human rights approach.

Above all, through these policies the EU continues to avoid two key issues: on the one hand, the need to open legal and safe channels for migration, which would prevent people risking their lives; on the other, the need to address the root causes of displacement by making all the Union's external actions coherent with a true human rights approach.

The perception that the EU's current approach to migration is not working and that better alternatives are needed is shared by both European platforms of CSOs, such as SOLIDAR¹², Volonteuropa¹³ and

¹¹ Following the European Parliament elections of 2014, the new European Commission includes for the first time a Directorate General on Migration (merged with Home Affairs): <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/>

¹² SOLIDAR Press Release, at http://www.solidar.org/IMG/pdf/2015_09_09_message_migration-3.pdf

¹³ Volonteuropa analysis, at <http://www.volonteuropa.eu/volonteuropa-reacts-to-the-european-migration-agenda/> See also the 2014

CONCORD¹⁴, and specialised networks, such as the Euro-African Migreurop¹⁵ or the group of activists Watch the Med – Alarm Phone¹⁶. This view is also shared by a significant number of European citizens, who have reacted to the humanitarian crisis with a massive mobilisation to welcome migrants and refugees that has taken different forms in different countries, sometimes with the support of local authorities and opposition parties¹⁷.

It is this message of solidarity and active citizenship which challenges the security approach of the European Agenda on Migration, and generates enough pressure to force some member states to increase their shamefully inadequate refugee relocation quotas (European Commission, 2015c)¹⁸.

We believe there are very important connections between migration, human rights, active citizenship and global justice. As we have seen, people are expressing solidarity and active citizenship in all spheres of life, from the most private gesture to the most public demonstration, from the most

private and individual spaces to collective and public demonstrations, and through their involvement in CSOs as volunteers and staff.



Given the involvement of civil society in shaping the SDGs, there was great potential for the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 agenda, not only due to the recognition of the role played by migration in achieving the MDGs (UN, 2015), but also due to the universal character of the new agenda, as migration and migrants are the embodiment of the bridges between the global north and south. Despite efforts by civil society¹⁹, we think that this potential has not been fulfilled in the final draft of the SDGs, where the main elements related to migration focus on health, education and decent work for all – including migrants – as well as on reducing remittance costs and ensuring an orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration through the implementation of well-managed migration policies (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015)²⁰.

However, we believe there is room for hope. The new framework provides a starting point from which to continue to advocate for the ratification of international human rights treaties and the expansion of rights for migrants. It also affords a space for struggle and the redefinition of what good ‘management’ – not control – of migratory

Report, at http://www.volonteupe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Volonteupe_Migration_Report_2014.pdf

¹⁴ CONCORD statement, at <http://www.concordeurope.org/news-room/item/425-european-ngos-urge-end-to-fortress-europe-approach-to-migration>

¹⁵ Migreurop appeal “Bridges, not weapons!”, at <http://www.migreurop.org/article2611.html?lang=fr>

¹⁶ Campaign “Ferries no Frontex!”, at [http://www.watchthemed.net/media/uploads/page/12/Ferries no Frontex.pdf](http://www.watchthemed.net/media/uploads/page/12/Ferries%20not%20Frontex.pdf)

¹⁷ See for example the German initiative to share flats with refugees, <http://www.refugees-welcome.net/>, the self-hosted platform created in Brussels <https://www.facebook.com/plateformerefugiesbxl> to support people reaching the city, confronting a local government closed to solidarity, or in a completely different order, the multiplication in different Spanish municipalities of the initiative “refuge cities” of the Barcelona’s City Council, closely linked to mobilisation and public pressure for answers to the current humanitarian crisis, at http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/09/03/inenglish/1441265025_504882.html

¹⁸ See Volonteupe’s consideration on this matter <http://www.volonteupe.eu/refugees-welcome-citizen-engagement-in-the-face-of-political-inertia/>

¹⁹ Look for instance at the proposals of the civil society’s Stockholm Agenda, at <http://gfmcivilsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Civil-Society-Migration-Stockholm-Agenda-June-2014.pdf>

²⁰ Sustainable Development Goals, at <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics>

flows means. European citizens are already fully involved, engaging in transformative action and setting the standard for governmental institutions to follow.

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CHAPTER 7

Global responsibility of the private sector

Voluntare

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a rise in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices in general and corporate volunteering in particular. Still, such practices could hardly be called ubiquitous. There is much evidence to show that corporate volunteering has a huge number of benefits. So the question remains: why don't more companies invest in corporate volunteering, and why are NGOs hesitant to work with corporate volunteers?

Introduction

The future of corporate volunteering looks promising, especially when we consider that an increasing number of organisations are discovering how to harness its power to achieve strategic impact. Its potential is huge, but it needs to be done properly. Corporate volunteering can be successful if it is done according to the same standards, and with the same level of professionalism, as any other project that a company implements.



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CSR refers to the way in which a company manages its interests with regard to employees, suppliers, shareholders and clients, taking into account its ecological and social impact. It respects all stakeholders, and is part of the actual strategy and overall

management of a company, creating long-term value and generating lasting competitive advantage.

European trends in corporate volunteering

In Europe, CSR is increasingly seen as being central to a company's strategic vision. A growing number of European companies are coming to the conclusion that CSR is not just a fad, a social marketing ploy or a 'hand-washing' exercise. Rather, given that the survival and success of a company is largely dependent on the way in which it relates to its stakeholders, CSR is of paramount importance.

In order to analyse the business case for CSR, European companies organise their arguments into four groups:

- Reducing costs and risks through management of relations with stakeholders;
- Achieving competitive advantage by influencing stakeholders' decisions;
- Improving corporate reputation and legitimisation, aligning the interests of stakeholders with those of the company; and
- Searching for synergies, meeting the needs of various interest groups without affecting the operations of the company.

It is possible to highlight other differentiating elements which drive CSR: a commitment to corporate volunteering coming from various public institutions in Europe, which companies incorporate into their CSR activities, and the impact on communities in which they work in collaboration with the public and third sectors. All of this is done in a very special way: through the voluntary participation of employees in joint activities.


"Volunteering is a creator of human and social capital. It is a pathway to integration and employment and a key factor for improving social cohesion. Above all, volunteering translates the fundamental values of justice, solidarity, inclusion and

citizenship upon which Europe is founded into action. Volunteers help shape European society, and volunteers who work outside of their home countries are actively helping to build a Citizens' Europe. Indeed, volunteering activities are implicitly linked with many EU policy areas – such as lifelong learning, rural development and sport – where they add a valuable dimension to European Union programmes.” (COM, 2011, p.2)

This is how the European Commission Communication on Volunteering begins, highlighting the great social importance accorded to volunteering by all European institutions.

At the European level, leaving aside the United Kingdom, corporate volunteering is still a recent phenomenon, as can be seen in the following graph.

Average age of corporate volunteering programmes



Source: Employee Volunteering in Europe, European Commission, 2014

The European Year of Volunteering 2011 significantly strengthened corporate volunteering in Europe. Up until now, we can say that this is an established phenomenon, with very important prospects for growth.

The main tendencies that can be observed in corporate volunteering are:

- **More alliances and stable relations between NGOs and companies.** Large companies are increasingly aware of the great impact that corporate volunteering can have, both socially and in a business sense. However, they need to launch

more ambitious, meaningful and long-lasting volunteering projects. For such projects, it is necessary to join forces with trusted social organisations. In this way long term corporate volunteering partnerships between business and civil society will become increasingly common.

- **Increased focus on actions targeted at natural or man-made disasters.** This trend has been notably strengthened through the implementation of the EU Aid Volunteers programme, through which the EU engages European citizens (individuals and corporate) in actively participating in volunteering projects related to humanitarian and emergency aid in developing countries.
- **Increased connection with the company's clients and consumers.** There is more use of 'promoted by the company' volunteering terminology, thus giving an important role to the promotion of volunteering not only to employees, but across all areas of company influence: clients, suppliers, family members, retirees and shareholders. It is possible to identify, for example, volunteering programmes in which companies invite their clients to participate as a way of strengthening links, creating a closer and more human perception of and identification with the company.
- **Growing public sector support for corporate volunteering and greater openness to the participation of corporate volunteers in public social programmes.** Increasingly, national and international public organisations are recognising corporate volunteering as a very effective means of addressing major societal challenges. Proof of this is the reference to corporate volunteering in several communications from the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the UN General Assembly, which in 2010 stated that: "The General Assembly [...] welcomes the expanding involvement of the private

sector in support of volunteerism, and encourages its further engagement through the expansion of corporate volunteering and employee volunteer activities” (A/RES/66/67).

- **Greater participation of employees in the management of corporate volunteer programmes and the design of social solutions with NGOs.** The active participation of volunteers in managing, planning and designing solutions to social challenges with NGOs highlights an important element in the context of strengthening employees’ involvement in volunteering programmes, as well as in the context of promoting innovation, teamwork and leadership skills, among others. This trend is in line with new concepts of volunteering, in which volunteers are not merely ‘hands’ to help, but can be involved, give opinions and contribute to diverse areas of volunteering.
- **Greater alignment of corporate volunteering programmes with the business objectives of companies, providing greater strategic value.** Several studies and experiences have demonstrated that good corporate volunteer programmes can have a tremendous impact on businesses and society. A key reason for this is that companies increasingly link their programmes with their strategic objectives and align their voluntary action with their core purpose, lending their expertise, experience and knowledge. The most successful corporate volunteer programmes are those which have done this dual alignment. For this reason, it is a trend to be followed.
- **Professional management of corporate volunteering programmes.** In line with the previous trend, it is perceived that the most successful programmes in terms of their impact and outreach are those with larger budgets and teams of professional managers. According to the

Corporate Volunteering Observatory (2013), the number of companies that spend more than 60,000 euros on their volunteering programmes has increased compared to the previous years. Such expenditure should include investment in volunteering managers. It is important to note that more than half of the companies with volunteer programmes (58%) have management teams of four people or less, while 17% of companies have 10 or more people managing their volunteering programmes (Ibid.).



IMPACT2030: Mobilising corporate volunteers for sustainable development

In September 2015, the Secretary General of the UN announced the new SDGs, outlining the ways in which public, private and third sector organisations, and citizens should work together over the next 15 years to tackle the great challenges facing humanity.

One initiative that will be part of this process is IMPACT2030. A global initiative led by the business sector and the UN, IMPACT2030 aims to mobilise corporate volunteers to contribute to the achievement of the new SDGs. The UN Office for Partnership and Volunteering, large multinational corporations (including Google, Microsoft, GSK, UPS, Ritz and Telefónica) and volunteer networks (including Volontare) have been members of the initiative’s Executive Committee since its launch.

IMPACT2030 is a testament to the importance now being accorded to corporate volunteering worldwide and a perfect example of how different social actors can come together to address global problems. This alliance between the UN and major corporations should position corporate volunteering as one of the most important forms of social and environmental intervention by businesses.

IMPACT2030 will work towards the attainment of the MDGs through:

- The creation of tools that will help companies focus part of their corporate volunteering initiatives on the new SDGs;
- The celebration of best practice in corporate volunteering from across the globe.
- The establishment stronger connections between companies and UN programmes, allowing part of companies' volunteering plans to be implemented alongside UN initiatives;
- The creation of regional structures to link local businesses with NGOs, with the aim of tackling the great challenges facing humanity;
- The provision of more information on whether companies are really making an impact on the SDGs through corporate volunteering; and
- The organisation of bi-annual summits to discuss how corporate volunteering is evolving and to share best practice, tools and trends.

IMPACT2030 seems set to lead the way in the development of corporate volunteering. So, to the thousands of companies and NGOs that are committed to this type of volunteering, we say: watch this space.

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CHAPTER 8

Governance, participation and accountability for sustainable development

CIECODE
Alianza por la Solidaridad

Abstract

Implementing and giving visibility to the post-2015 development agenda will require high levels of citizen participation and strong social mobilisation. Deep political change is needed at all levels if the international community is to commit to the SDGs. However, does the post-2015 agenda have the potential to be truly transformative? Does it have the tools and mechanisms to drive the systemic changes needed and to be accountable to citizens?

Introduction

In the post-2015 agenda, issues of governance, accountability, transparency and social participation are considered as instrumental mechanisms, and not as constitutive matters of the institutional system. And yet, these issues are key to the attainment of the SDGs.

The same challenges are found at the EU level and across its member states. Civil society participation is impeded by a widespread lack of transparency around sustainable development issues and decision making processes. A political culture of accountability is non-existent. And, in many cases, formal spaces for citizen participation are irrelevant in practice.

Despite these challenges, civil society has learnt how to voice its concerns outside institutional channels, when these have not provided answers. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal is for institutions to treat civil society proposals as their own. Civil society must convince every institution to open new channels for effective participation and

accountability, which are indispensable requirements of 'common good' governance.

"We envisage a world free of poverty, hunger, disease and want, where all life can thrive. We envisage a world free of fear and violence. A world with universal literacy. A world with equitable and universal access to quality education at all levels, to health care and social protection, where physical, mental and social well-being are assured [...] A world of universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality and non-discrimination; of respect for race, ethnicity and cultural diversity [...] A world in which every woman and girl enjoys full gender equality and all legal, social and economic barriers to their empowerment have been removed. A just, equitable, tolerant, open and socially inclusive world in which the needs of the most vulnerable are met [...] One in which humanity lives in harmony with nature and in which wildlife and other living species are protected." (UN, 2015a, pp.3-4)

We fully share this vision of the world, with its insistence that "no one will be left behind" (UN, 2015a, p. 2).



This vision connects with our own aspirations, as individuals and societies, in our search for the common good (Sluga, 2014). It reflects the principles of inclusiveness, social justice, collaboration and sustainability which guide the actions of Volonteuropa and other CSOs which, like Alianza por la Solidaridad, work across the world for sustainable development and the global common good.

It is a narrative that unites everyone, from north to south, to face the big challenge of inequality across our planet, a challenge which the sustainable development agenda has to address²¹. In light of a new global agreement, which commits the EU itself²², we wonder: is it really a transformative agenda? Or is it an aspiration which, once implemented, will lack accountability and the instruments and mechanisms needed to influence policymaking?

We know that in order to achieve the SDGs, the willingness of governments is absolutely indispensable. Dialogue with society, citizen participation and responsible engagement by the business sector (multinationals, as well as small and medium enterprises) will play a crucial role in this process.

Unfortunately, the post-2015 agenda, as highlighted by CSOs which took part in the last negotiations, lacks “urgency, a clear implementation strategy and accountability” (Deen, 2015). Indeed, the concepts of governance, accountability, transparency and social participation are considered in this Declaration as instrumental mechanisms of an internal, technical or functional nature, rather than intrinsically political matters related to systemic changes which need to be addressed in order to achieve the SDGs. We

²¹This diagnosis refers to the increasing inequality and the wealth gap between countries, stressing the risk to wellbeing in different societies and to the planet. It is also linked to mass demographic movements due to conflict and humanitarian reasons. See point 14 “Our world today” in that document (UN, 2015, pp. 4-5).

²²See the European Council’s conclusions of 26th May 2015 in A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development, which incorporated the guidelines on this topic to the principles of universality and co-responsibility of states. The conclusions take into account states’ capabilities and promote an inclusive multi-stakeholder focus. “The new global partnership should also be based on and promote human rights, equality, non-discrimination, democratic institutions, good governance, rule of law, inclusiveness, environmental sustainability and respect for planetary boundaries. Women’s rights, gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, as well as being ends in themselves, are a key means of implementation and should be promoted at all levels” (European Council, 2015).

will discuss some of these questions, while not treating them as an exhaustive list.

Citizenship and participation: do we mean local and global?

Although the new Sustainable Development Agenda (UN, 2015a, p. 8) mentions the “ethic of global citizenship” and shared responsibility, this is one of very few references to the power of citizens included in the document. While it is an Agenda for the people and from the people – “We, the people” (UN, 2015a, p. 10) – the exercise of citizenship does not, however, constitute part of the ‘institutionalisation’ of the system.

We accept that the 17 SDGs and their 169 targets considerably expand the scope of action for different associations working for the common good and an end to inequalities. In addition, citizens’ awareness about development is one of the targets to be implemented²³. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Declaration affirms that accountability must benefit citizens directly (UN, 2014a, p. 15)²⁴, this is limited to monitoring only. Social participation, notwithstanding the formal processes of consultation followed in the preparation and subsequent revision of the agenda, is not seen as a matter of ‘governance’ or directly linked to public policies to be undertaken. It does not belong to the institutional process, neither to matters of systemic character²⁵ that the Agenda sets out (UN, 2015a, p. 23). Therefore, it is crucial to establish open and inclusive mechanisms that legitimise the

²³ See the SDG 4.7: “By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development” (UN, 2014, p. 15).

²⁴ See point 73 in the Declaration that refers to a system “Operating at the national, regional and global levels, it will promote accountability to our citizens” (UN, 2015, p. 27).

²⁵ See points 13 to 15 and 17 from the part “Systemic issues” in the Declaration.

agenda and guarantee that social participation goes beyond mere formalities of consultation to integrate citizenship and CSOs as democratising and mobilising elements of the agenda²⁶.

The remaining challenge of governance and the lack of ambition to change the model

Its impact on the Agenda is discouraging. In practice, the concept of “good governance” (UN, 2015a, pp. 4-8)²⁷ refers to formal legal aspects and the proper functioning of institutions. The willingness of governments to establish a fairer global order and governance does not appear in the Agenda. It limits itself to analysing “matters of systemic character”, which refer to political coherence and coordination, without mentioning the necessary governance of the economy. However, there are several references to the business sector from a clearly neoliberal perspective²⁸ (UN, 2015a, p. 23). Overall, the Declaration only aspires to “enhance global macroeconomic stability” (UN, 2015a, p. 24)²⁹.



The lack of political leadership and will to establish strong institutions which ensure the viability of the Agenda on the SDGs is evident. Nevertheless, the Declaration puts

²⁶ In coherence with the SDG 16 referring to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, especially, as cited in part 7: “Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels”

⁸ See points 9 and 34 in the Declaration (UN, 2015, pp. 4-8).

⁹ See points 17.13 in the declaration: “Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence” (UN, 2015, p.23).

¹⁰ See point 63 in the Declaration (UN, 2015, p.24).

forward the need to “respect the space and capacity of leadership in every country” to establish and implement their own policies for poverty reduction and sustainable development. In this respect, the EU leadership still has considerable work to do, as exemplified by the recent Greek crisis³⁰.

Transparency and accountability: going beyond mere mechanisms of communication and institutional information

The Declaration calls for “establishing a robust framework for reviewing and monitoring” SDGs at the national, regional and global levels, including a mechanism of accountability to citizens (UN, 2015a, pp. 26-27). However, when analysed, the transparency mechanisms mentioned in the Declaration are limited to questions of information, data and indicators, and a tedious process of revision (mainly ex-post), provided by multiple UN agencies, including those coming from civil society (UN, 2015a, pp. 27-29)³¹.

Reflections, contributions and experiences from civil society

The same challenges can also be identified at the EU, as well as national, regional and local levels. As CIECODE, based on our experience in this field in Spain, we want to share some reflections and practices that can help to identify the principal challenges regarding governance, transparency and accountability, as well as identify the role we want to play as European civil society.

³⁰ See point 17, 15 from systemic issues. The current context of the Greek crisis (the debt and rescue conditions) must be considered, as well as the lack of common will and common mechanisms of political and social cohesion, beyond the monetary union, at the centre of the EU.

³¹ Consulting the part related to monitoring and accountability mechanisms, points 72 to 91 in the Declaration.

Transparency as a tool: indispensable but not enough

Transparency is a key element for achieving efficient participation and facilitating real accountability. It is a fact that society is only able to come up with solutions when it is conscious of the significance of a problem and understands it properly. Therefore, low quality information related to areas of specific interest for sustainable development is one of the main limitations which CSOs currently face in participation and influencing.

As mentioned before, we accept that the agenda takes forward and emphasises the creation of indicators, data and open information³². However, access to information and transparency per se are not enough. They are tools which helps us better understand and manage collective issues in order to be able to change realities. To be really transformative, transparency must be accompanied by concrete mechanisms which help to contextualise and analyse data, allowing us to deliberate publicly about alternative political responses. That is, transparency as a principle must be introduced in the institutional culture and promote frameworks which encourage citizens to work collectively. Without them, we have an informed society which is unable to influence in the political arena.

Processes of decision-making and accountability: unfinished business

It is fundamental that transparency also extends to the process of decision-making in an effective and meaningful way. Unfortunately, that aspect has been excluded from the SDGs Agenda. We are still a long way from achieving this goal at the global level (EU and member states included).

³² Some of the main positions regarding the SDGs agenda and the *Transparency, Accountability and Participation* (TAP) funding have been included in the final document of the Addis Ababa's Conference in July 2015 http://www.access-info.org/wp-content/uploads/TAP_Network_FfD3_Position_Paper.pdf

The lack of access to updated and accurate information about the decision-making process makes it nearly impossible to really connect it with collective interests and restricts possibilities for participation. The lack of transparency in some of these relevant processes for development at the centre of the EU is evident. Perhaps the most well-known and recent case is that of the TTIP negotiations³³ on which information is drip-fed, despite the implications that it will have not only for European citizens, but for trade and labour relations, access to certain goods and services, and the options for people's development at a global level.

The case of the Spanish Parliament, which CIECODE knows better through the Avizor and TIPI projects³⁴, is another good example. Information as significant as the votes of deputies in parliamentary commissions is not easily accessible³⁵. The lack of effective access to parliamentary information serves as an institutional barrier to citizen participation. Indeed, it reflects one of the main weaknesses in Spanish politics: the lack of a political culture of accountability by the government. In many cases, reports, drafts or any governmental sources used in decision-making are also not accessible, and there are no basic regulations on lobbying.

These aspects go beyond the issues of poverty and inequality, and are linked with current public debates on the eroding legitimacy and proper functioning of

³³ The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership - or TTIP - is the trade and investment deal that the EU is negotiating with the US.

³⁴ For more information, check CIECODE's monitoring and accountability projects on parliamentary activity. Online at: www.proyectoavizor.es y www.tipiciudadano.es

³⁵ Official Gazettes of Parliament and Parliamentary Report in Spain collect the total numbers of votes but not by political party or individual deputy. The Committee's Sessions are also re-run on TV and the vote must be taken by a show of hands but, in reality, as a consequence of parliamentary discipline, it is very difficult to identify who votes for what. Further analysis can be found here: Informe Avizor 2014: un año de seguimiento de la actividad parlamentaria en materia de desarrollo (Gutiérrez, A. y Pérez, J., 2015) and in previous Annual Reports.

democratic institutions at the global level. However, they gain particular relevance in matters of poverty and inequality in which the capacity to demand accountability is even more limited.

The use, improvement and adaptation of accountability tools in decision-making, which already exist in other areas, can help make the implementation of the Agenda and the processes of revision of SDGs more transparent. While not being exhaustive, it is possible to cite examples of the current 'institutionalism': the creation of ex ante impact evaluations; the push for multi-actor formal and informal meetings; peer reviews, such as those carried out in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the OECD; the opening of consultations in political planning to civil society, using new communication and information technologies; and the establishment of control mechanisms during the formulation of policies and legislative changes, such as opinions on political coherence by the Development Commission in the European Parliament.

Participating is not the same as influencing

In order to have effective participation it is essential that citizens have real opportunities to influence the processes in which they are participating. If participation is perceived as irrelevant, the process becomes of no interest for the stakeholders.

The lack of will to adopt an ambitious and concrete strategy to improve civil society participation makes the formal mechanisms of participation inefficient. There are many examples of CSOs being invited to participate in formal consultation processes, with organisations investing time and resources to make proposals, for which there is no information on whether the proposals have been accepted.

In that sense, the participation process created for the elaboration of SDGs can be regarded as positive (citizens were extensively consulted at the global level and CSOs participated in some earlier regional

processes). However, this has been much less so in the case of implementation tools – resources – or in the specification of indicators. At the Third International Conference of Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 2015 (UN, 2015b), the participation process came up against the lack of concrete commitments on issues as paramount as the funding of the Agenda and the necessary systemic changes.

Thus, participation in itself is not enough, and new mechanisms are needed to promote the 'return of participation'. That is, participation must work towards changing something, while accountability is about informing how participation has influenced the process, the progress made and obstacles encountered, and how different proposals were included.

Civil society as a driving force for change

Despite all the challenges, civil society has learnt how to channel its concerns outside of the institutions when those have not provided answers.

Civil society is a driving force behind independent initiatives for transparency on human rights and development. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Transparency for Development, Publish What You Fund and International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) are good examples of this.

Furthermore, over recent years, civil society movements, initiatives and campaigns have surged, seeking to shed light on decision-making processes, both at the European level and in different member states. The ethical regulation on lobbying, the legislative footprint or the votes of elected representatives are issues that transcend the domain of the post-2015 agenda, but they are intrinsically related to a transformative vision of citizens in the decision-making process. Projects led by European civil society, such as access-info, asktheEU, Corporate Europe Observatory, VoteWatch Europe or alterEU, shed more light. Additionally, there are several initiatives coming from different member states, as in

the case of WeCitizens in Belgium, RegardsCitoyens in France, Parliament Watch in Germany or Qué hacen los Diputados and the Avizor Project in Spain.

The search for synergies between development and transparency organisations, fields that had been perceived as different not so long ago, is gaining strength, thanks partly to the opportunities offered by ICT, having also been included in the actual Agenda for Development³⁶ (UN, 2015a).

Other examples can also be cited, which show how innovations and proposals by civil society have an 'impact' on institutions and raise citizens' awareness, thus changing political dynamics. One of the most remarkable cases in Spain is the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH). The organisation, which has undertaken the fight against mortgage evictions in Spain, has learnt to combine participation inside and outside of traditional institutional channels to achieve some of its goals (presented in the People's Legislative Initiative, which stopped numerous evictions), and having unexpected impact. In fact, PAH received the 2013 European Citizens' Award of the European Parliament, while Ana Colau, PAH's President, subsequently became the Mayor of Barcelona in May 2015, making international headlines. In addition to the example of Barcelona, other social activists became mayors in important cities, such as Madrid and Zaragoza, in the most recent municipal elections in Spain. These elected officials have negotiated with public institutions – such as the judicial power – and the private sector – such as banks – in order

to find political solutions to evictions and other social issues.

Beyond Europe, a particularly inspiring example is that of the Intelligent Citizen (Ciudadano Inteligente), a Chilean platform which provides online transparency tools on political accountability. Some of the tools have even been used by the government itself, to improve transparency and efficiency in citizen participation³⁷.

Transforming the development agenda into action: more citizenship based on public global interest

In order to establish a transparent and responsible global governance framework, based on public global interest, it is clear that the main common challenge for CSOs in the new SDGs Agenda will be to increase levels of active citizenship, secure more civil society involvement and develop more campaigns and platforms for action.

As European civil society, we have an important role to play, driving and monitoring implementation. We can help ensure that our public and private institutions accept responsibility for the SDGs, act transparently and adopt decisions in a participative and responsible manner. However, we cannot forget that if we want an inclusive transformation, the ultimate goal must be that institutions take ownership of these innovations.

To conclude, even before transparency is achieved in its entirety, it is necessary that an empowered civil society persuades governments and public institutions to adopt transparent methods and tools, opening a path towards effective participation and responsible accountability, which are indispensable requirements of common good governance.

³⁶ This boost has taken place especially from 2011 with the launch of "The Alliance for Open Government" and in 2012 with the diffusion of "The Declaration on Parliamentary Openness" in which numerous CSOs from more than 38 countries participated. The final declaration of Addis Ababa in July 2015 (UN, 2015b) highlights the necessity to develop synergies between development agencies and open government. For more information, see: <http://www.opengovpartnership.org/es> and <http://www.openingparliament.org/>

³⁷ The Chilean government adopted part of the project's philosophy regarding analysis and accountability of government policies. For more information, see: <http://ciudadanointeligente.org/>

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Transparency and accountability in development and poverty reduction is a major area of focus for CIECODE.



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